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INTRODUCTION
As the last act of its 2014-2015 Term, the Supreme Court
struck down a major EPA regulation limiting mercury emis-
sions from electrical power plants.1  The legal reason was the
EPA’s failure to consider the costs of regulating mercury before
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1 See generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705–07 (2015).
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deciding that it must be regulated.2  But the cost of the regula-
tion—$9.6 billion—would not have attracted such attention if it
had not seemed so disproportionate to the regulatory benefits.
The only mercury-related benefits that the EPA included in its
analysis were avoided harms to the children born to women
who consumed fish high in mercury while pregnant.3  Against
$9.6 billion in costs, EPA calculated only about $5 million in
benefits—a ratio of 1,920 to 1.4  The imbalance in this ratio had
a significant impact upon the Court.  As Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote for the majority in Michigan v. EPA, “One would not say
that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose
billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars
in health or environmental benefits.”5
Yet the EPA believed that human exposure to mercury
emissions caused significant other harms: developmental de-
lays, memory loss, and behavioral dysfunctions; diminished
cardiovascular health; and a variety of toxic immunologic ef-
fects.6  Mercury emissions also harm fish, birds, and mam-
mals, and the recreational hunters and fishermen who catch
them.  By reducing mercury emissions, the regulation would
produce numerous health and environmental benefits.  The
problem was that the EPA did not quantify any of these benefits
in its cost-benefit analysis.  They are discussed in the regula-
tion at great length, and the regulation includes citations to
scientific and economic studies on these other effects of mer-
cury.7  But the agency did not place a dollar figure on the value
of these benefits.8  That decision was fatal to the regulation.
This is not the only instance in which an agency has failed
to fully quantify the costs or benefits of its regulations.  Regula-
2 See id. at 2711.
3 See EPA, EPA-452/R-11-011, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS ES–1 (2011), http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/
regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7GF-PEMM].  We describe
the legal rule governing the case and the Court’s holding in greater detail in Part
IV, infra.
4 EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
5 Id. at 2707 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).
6 EPA, supra note 3, at ES–10 to –13 tbl.ES–5. R
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See, e.g., EPA, EPA-452/R-97-003, MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS
4–2 to 4–4 tbl.4–1 (1997), https://www.epa.gov/mercury/mercury-study-report-
congress [https://perma.cc/XWM9-UJ28] (containing an eight volume report de-
tailing the magnitude of U.S. mercury emissions and their implications without
placing a dollar figure on the benefits); MARTIN HASSAUER ET AL., EUROPEAN FOOD
SAFETY AUTH., COLLATE THE LITERATURE ON TOXICITY DATA ON MERCURY IN EXPERIMENTAL
ANIMALS AND HUMANS 3–4 (2012) (surveying a vast body of scientific literature on
the toxicity of methyl and inorganic mercury).
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tory agencies are required to perform cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) of major rules.9  However, in many cases regulators re-
fuse to report a monetized value for the benefits of a rule that
they issue: Sometimes, they report no monetized value;10 at
other times, they report a monetized value but also state that
not all benefits have been quantified.11  On occasion, regula-
tors also refuse to monetize or fully monetize costs.12  These
practices raise a puzzle.  Cost-benefit analysis is a decision
procedure that requires the decision-maker to estimate both
the benefits and the costs of a regulation in monetary terms.  If
a regulator chooses not to monetize all the benefits or all the
costs, it is not doing cost-benefit analysis.  If it is not doing
cost-benefit analysis, what is it doing?
Consider some other examples.  The Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) issued a regulation that modified the school
lunch program in light of new research on diet.13  The USDA
estimated a compliance cost of $3.189 billion but refused to
monetize benefits because it lacked an empirical basis to esti-
mate the effect of the improved diet on obesity and other health
problems.14  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is-
sued a regulation that set standards for the allowable concen-
tration of living organisms in ballast water that ships discharge
in U.S. waters.15  DHS estimated annual compliance costs of
9 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 102-03 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1994),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012); OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1-3
(2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regula-
tory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JMU-FZYS].
10 See, e.g., Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,
44,396, 44,569–71 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804,
807, 820, & 897) (detailing the public health problems caused by cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products as justification for limiting children’s and adoles-
cents’ access to such products).
11 DEP’T OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL REVISED REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING TITLES
II AND III OF THE ADA, INCLUDING REVISED ADA STANDARDS FOR ACCESSIBLE DESIGN 67
(2010), http://www.ada.gov/regs2010/RIA_2010regs/DOJ%20ADA%20Final
%20RIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW2F-DDPJ].
12 See, e.g., id. at vii (noting the presence of “costs that cannot be quantified
due to methodological and data constraints”).
13 See generally Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and
School Breakfast Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4088 (Jan. 26, 2012) (codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 210 & 220).
14 Id. at 4,122, 4,132–33.
15 See generally Standards for Living Organisms in Ships’ Ballast Water Dis-
charged in U.S. Waters, 77 Fed. Reg. 17254, 17254 (Mar. 23, 2012) (to be codified
at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151 & 46 C.F.R. pt. 162).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 4  8-NOV-16 12:37
90 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:87
$92 million and benefits of $141 to $240 million but further
explained that it could not accurately estimate (and hence
monetize) most benefits because of the lack of scientific knowl-
edge of the likelihood that organisms discharged from ballast
water will invade U.S. territory and of how much economic
damage they could cause.16  And the Department of Justice
issued regulations that require prisons to take steps to reduce
the incidence of prison rape.17  The agency estimated costs of
$468.5 million per year to improve monitoring and security but
refused to estimate benefits because it lacked information
needed for estimating the effect of the rule on the prevalence of
rape (it did, however, estimate the monetized benefit of an
avoided rape).18  All of these regulations were promulgated de-
spite the absence of a formal cost-benefit analysis that mone-
tized all the costs and benefits.19
The Obama administration’s recent greenhouse gas regula-
tion (the “Clean Power Plan”) similarly includes significant un-
quantified benefits.  The EPA estimated the climate change-
related benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions as well as
related benefits from eliminating particulate matter emis-
sions.20  However, it left uncalculated a wide range of other
related benefits, including reductions in morbidity and mortal-
ity due to ozone, nitrous oxide, sulfur oxide, and mercury; envi-
ronmental benefits to vegetation and animals; and benefits
from increased atmospheric visibility and reductions in harm
to materials and homes from acid rain and other airborne pol-
lution.21  Despite these unquantified benefits, EPA nonetheless
estimated that the regulation would produce between $49 and
$84 billion in net benefits by 2030, using a 3% discount rate.22
16 Id. at 17,300–01.
17 See generally National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to
Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37106, 37106 (June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.
115).
18 Id. at 37,110–11.
19 In at least one case, a court invalidated regulations because the agency
failed to quantify benefits in a cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1202–03 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that the failure of the agency to monetize benefits of the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions was arbitrary and capricious).  But these cases are
rare.
20 EPA, EPA-452/R-14-002, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED
CARBON POLLUTION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS AND EMISSION STANDARDS
FOR MODIFIED AND RECONSTRUCTED POWER PLANTS ES 18–19 (2015), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602ria-clean-
power-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD5U-DTS8].
21 See id. at ES–18 tbl.ES–6.
22 Id. at ES–23 tbl.ES–10.
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The regulation was cost-benefit justified even without the addi-
tional benefits.  But the agency’s failure to quantify these addi-
tional benefits implies that the EPA might have been justified in
promulgating an even stronger greenhouse gas regulation had
it fully accounted for the benefits such a regulation would
provide.
If regulators are supposed to perform cost-benefit analysis
of major rules, why are so many rules issued without mone-
tized costs and benefits?  A tempting explanation is that regu-
lators are sometimes compelled by statute to issue regulations,
and so they must do so, whether or not those regulations sat-
isfy a cost-benefit analysis.23  But there is a deeper problem
here.  Even in such cases, regulators are required by an execu-
tive order to perform cost-benefit analysis.24  They can conduct
a cost-benefit analysis, find that a regulation fails it, and none-
theless issue the regulation with the accompanying cost-bene-
fit analysis.  They can explain that they must issue the
regulation because of a statute or that they choose to issue the
regulation because it has desirable impacts on equity, fairness,
or the distribution of wealth.  But they must—and should—still
provide a valid cost-benefit analysis.  The cost-benefit analysis
provides information to Congress and the public.25  If the stat-
ute forces the agency to promulgate a regulation whose costs
exceed its benefits, a cost-benefit analysis will reveal to Con-
gress that the statute was inefficient and that Congress should
repeal or amend it.  Yet in most cases agencies do not perform
these cost-benefit analyses.
We suspect that it would be embarrassing for a regulator to
issue a regulation that fails a cost-benefit analysis by its own
admission.  Moreover, even if there is a statutory mandate, the
regulator may fear that regulation that, by the agency’s admis-
sion, fails a cost-benefit analysis would be vulnerable to attack
in court as arbitrary and capricious.26 And, whatever the possi-
ble outcome of judicial review, agencies that estimate mone-
tized benefits based on limited data will be forced to contend in
23 See infra Part II.
24 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 102-03 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1994),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012).
25 For instance, under the Congressional Review Act, the Government Ac-
countability Office is required to summarize the cost-benefit analysis of all major
rules and make the information available to Congress. See Congressional Review
Act FAQs, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/legal/congres
sional-review-act/faq [https://perma.cc/XV9Y-5DJJ].
26 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
46 (1983).
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agency hearings and in the political arena with regulated par-
ties who counter with their own estimates.  Thus, it will be
tempting for regulators to claim unquantifiable benefits even
when they can be quantified.
More generally, we suspect that agency failures to fully
quantify benefits may be leading to both under- and over-regu-
lation.  In some instances, agencies may be justifying regula-
tions that do not pass a cost-benefit test on the basis of
unquantified benefits, without any way of knowing whether
those unquantified benefits exceed the known costs.  In other
cases, agencies may be failing to regulate strongly enough be-
cause they are not counting all of the benefits of doing so.
To test these hypotheses, we compiled a data set consisting
of all major regulations issued by agencies from 2010 to 2013.
After analyzing the dataset we come to the following conclu-
sions.  First, there are countless examples (far more than we
can describe) where agencies fail to fully monetize the benefits
and costs of regulations.  Second, in most cases, agencies
could monetize or partially monetize those benefits and costs.
Third, agencies’ failures to quantify benefits are almost cer-
tainly masking errors of over-regulation and under-regulation.
And fourth, even where monetization would be difficult, the
agencies could and should have made explicit the implicit valu-
ations they relied on and supported those valuations as much
as possible with empirical evidence.
We then proceed to explain how agencies could engage in
cost-benefit analysis even when they do not have a reliable
basis for estimating valuations.  We argue that even where they
lack complete data, agency regulators may be able to make
reasonable guesses about the harms or benefits from regula-
tions.  In many cases, these guesses will be based on the expe-
rience and latent knowledge of the agency staff.  While agencies
should be permitted to “guess”—that is, supply a subjective
prior probability—they must also be required to update their
estimates as they gain new information.  In particular, agencies
should be required to (1) provide a mechanism for empirically
evaluating their estimates after the regulation is issued; (2)
revisit and update their earlier estimates in light of what subse-
quent studies reveal; and (3) use consistent estimates across
agencies.  We describe our proposal as loosely “Bayesian”27 be-
27 Purists can treat our invocation of the rule as metaphorical if they wish.
We use it to refer to the idea that an agent must update her belief about the
distribution of outcomes when she receives new information.  Bayes’ Rule pro-
vides the formula for such updating; we have not found it necessary to invoke the
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cause of the emphasis on the importance of updating priors as
an institutional solution to the problem of regulatory
uncertainty.28
Our paper is related to two strands in the legal literature.
A number of papers have criticized regulatory agencies for fail-
ing to properly monetize costs and benefits.29  The authors of
these papers suggest that if benefits cannot be quantified, they
should be set at zero.30  We argue that this view is mistaken.
Another group of papers argue about various ways that agen-
cies can deal with hard-to-monetize costs and benefits.  Some
authors argue that agencies should regulate without monetiz-
ing benefits and costs, but these authors have had trouble
explaining how they think agencies should decide what to do.
For example, John Coates argues that financial regulators
should weigh costs and benefits without quantifying them; we
do not understand what that could mean.31  A few efforts have
formula to make the argument in this paper.  We have relied on the subjective
rather than frequentist approach to probability, and when we talk about the
“Bayesian turn,” we mean to push for this idea as well, though technically Bayes’
Rule can be used in frequentist probability theory as well.
28 Our argument therefore is similar in spirit to Stephen Charest, Bayesian
Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 265,
268–70 (2002), although Charest’s main interest is how Bayes’ Rule may help
address concerns underlying the precautionary principle and help reconcile that
principle with cost-benefit analysis. See also David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can They Be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 771, 812–15 (2013) (making a similar argument).  We are skeptical that
Bayes’ Rule advances the values underlying the precautionary principle, but this
debate lies outside the scope of our paper.  For a brief discussion of Bayesian
approach to cost-benefit analysis of financial regulations, see Robert P. Bartlett,
III, The Institutional Framework for Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A
Tale of Four Paradigms?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S379, S397–400 (2014).  Finally, there
are a few papers that argue in the same spirit as ours that one way to address
uncertainty is to revisit regulations and update priors. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, An
Options Approach to Agency Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 909 (2013) (dis-
cussing how a regulator in the face of uncertainty can employ a sunset provision
to promulgate a rule and update its prior at a later date for a more outcome-based
approach); Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579,
589–91, 596 (2014) (discussing retrospective reviews of regulations conducted by
agencies).
29 See infra note 52. R
30 See infra note 56. R
31 Compare John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:
Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 998 (2015) (arguing against
quantification), with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for
Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393–96 (2013) (proposing princi-
ples for quantitative evaluation of regulatory tradeoffs), and Eric A. Posner & E.
Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S1,
S1 (2014) (building on the authors’ previous work on such quantification). See
generally Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 93, 120–62 (2015) (cataloguing the use of cost-benefit analysis by
academics and the federal government).
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been made to supply agencies with a formal framework for
acting in the face of unquantified benefits.32  Contrary to these
approaches, in this paper we suggest how agencies might en-
gage in quantitative analysis even in the face of uncertainty.
I
THE MODERN STATE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An enormous literature describes CBA, how it is used in
government, and whether it is appropriate for regulators to
employ it.33  For reasons of space, we will skip over most of
these issues, and focus on those features of CBA and its history
that are relevant to the present inquiry into the problem of
unquantified benefits.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is a decision-procedure that an agent
uses to decide whether or not to take a course of action.34  To
use CBA, the agent determines the costs and benefits of the
action in monetary terms and engages in the action only if the
benefits exceed the costs.35
When regulators use CBA, they should—in theory—per-
form a rigorous analysis based on available empirical data;
“guesstimates” will not do.36  Consider the USDA’s school
lunch program.37  If the program requires schools to provide
children with apples rather than a bag of potato chips, then the
cost of the program is the price of an apple minus the price of
the bag of potato chips multiplied by the number of children
who receive lunches under the program.   A sophisticated cost-
32 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV.
1369, 1387–90 (2014) (advocating the use of “breakeven analysis”); Adrian
Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law), 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. S475, S480–81 (2015) (arguing for deferential review of agency-level deci-
sions regarding costs and benefits under uncertainty).
33 The literature is too vast to cite.  For book-length treatments, see MATTHEW
D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006);
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY (2008); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATION PROTECTION (2002).
34 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 33, at 6. R
35 Ideally, the agency would select the regulation that maximizes benefits net
of costs.
36 Thus, when we refer to CBA, we mean “formal” rather than “informal” CBA,
where the latter refers merely to the idea of balancing. See Sinden, supra note 31, R
at 99 (explaining the differences between a formal, quantified CBA and an infor-
mal, qualitative CBA).
37 See generally Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and
School Breakfast Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4088 (Jan. 26, 2012) (codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 210 & 220).
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benefit analysis would take account of other factors as well—
for example, that it may be more expensive to store and handle
apples (which can bruise and rot) than bags of potato chips,
that their prices may fluctuate, and so on.  Sometimes, regula-
tors overestimate costs because they fail to anticipate how new
technologies develop that reduce costs.38  That said, cost esti-
mates are usually straightforward exercises in accounting and
can take advantage of data that industry, government, and
academia have collected for their own purposes.
By contrast, determining the monetary benefits of a regula-
tion is often difficult.39  If children are given apples rather than
potato chips, they may throw away the apples rather than eat
them.  They may use pocket money to get their carbohydrate fix
from a vending machine or after school.  If some children eat
apples, it is possible that the additional nutritional benefit will,
in fact, have zero or trivial health effects.  So there is an initial
question about whether the regulation will have the intended
effect on behavior and a second question about whether, even if
it does, the effect will be positive.  And then a third question is
how to measure positive effects.  Sometimes, this will be easy.
If the school lunch program reduces the number of children
who become diabetic, then the benefits associated with reduc-
ing the incidence of diabetes may be calculated.  But other
benefits may be real but hard to value in monetary terms.
Thinner children may enjoy enhanced self-esteem and more
energy, which may improve their studies; but all of these things
will be hard to put in monetary terms because there is no
market in self-esteem or energy and hence no market value for
these things.
To sum up, let us distinguish between two sources of ambi-
guity in the calculation of benefits.  First, there is a causation
problem, by which we mean empirical uncertainty as to
whether a regulation will have intended behavioral effects.
Second, there is a monetization problem: certain benefits are
hard to monetize because no market exists in those benefits.
Both problems can tempt a regulator to argue that a regulation
has unquantifiable benefits.
38 See HART HODGES, ECON. POLICY INST., FALLING PRICES: COST OF COMPLYING
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ALMOST ALWAYS LESS THAN ADVERTISED 6 (1997);
Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2031 (2002).
39 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1375–76 (explaining that quantifying R
benefits is difficult because of epistemic problems, objections to standard eco-
nomic thinking about monetization, and incommensurability).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-NOV-16 12:37
96 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:87
B. The Institutional Structure
Regulators derive their authority to regulate from statutes
enacted by Congress, but these statutes rarely direct regula-
tors to use CBA.40  Most statutes provide general standards for
improving public health or safety or achieving other goals.41
Courts have given regulators wide latitude to interpret these
statutes, and this has given them a great deal of freedom to
choose the stringency, scope, and method of regulation, as long
as they provide an adequate explanation for the regulation they
choose.42
Before the 1980s, some regulators informally used cost-
benefit analysis to justify regulations.43  In 1981, President
Reagan signed an executive order that required most regula-
tors to perform cost-benefit analysis for major regulations
(those having an economic impact of at least $100 million per
year).44  The executive order was controversial at the time.
Many people believed that it erected bureaucratic hurdles for
the purpose of blocking or delaying needed regulations.45  But
all subsequent presidents, including Bill Clinton and Barack
Obama, extended Reagan’s CBA with some modifications.46
CBA now has adherents on both the left and right who believe
that it is a sensible, technocratic device for ensuring that a
regulation is rational rather than arbitrary, though it remains
controversial.47
Today, most regulators are required to perform CBAs and
do so—in the sense of doing the necessary calculations, or
some of them, and reporting the results—for all major regula-
tions.  They report their calculations in Regulatory Impact As-
40 But see Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015) (holding that the
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to consider costs, even if it need not necessarily
conduct full-blown CBA).
41 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012) (providing that the Administration shall
regulate electric utility steam generating units if the Administrator finds it “appro-
priate and necessary”).
42 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsi-
bilities may . . . properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise
policy to inform its judgments.”).
43 Adler & Posner, supra note 33, at 11. R
44 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127–28 (1982) (revoked in
1993).
45 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 33, at 2–4. R
46 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215–17 (2012), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-03 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638–40
(1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012).
47 For criticisms, see generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 93–96 (2004).
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sessments (RIAs) that accompany the regulations.48  However,
as we will see, they do not always quantify benefits.  And it is
not clear that even when regulators do a proper CBA, they
follow it.  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, the
executive orders that require CBA are not legally enforceable.49
Regulators are required to submit proposed regulations along
with associated CBAs to the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs (OIRA), which is in the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in the White House, but OIRA, OMB, and the
president are free to waive or relax the CBA standard if they
wish to.50  Second, at least some statutes either forbid regula-
tors to use CBA or make it difficult for them to do so because
they impose specific requirements on regulators.  For example,
when statutes tell a regulator to reduce pollution below a speci-
fied quantitative threshold that is itself not cost-justified, the
regulator must do so, regardless of what its own CBA may tell
it.  In this context, the executive order functions as a reporting
requirement; it does not supersede statutory language.  Adding
to the confusion, courts sometimes disagree about when regu-
lators must use CBA, may use it, and cannot use it.51
C. The Debate on Unquantified Benefits
In a number of influential papers published in the 1980s
and 1990s, a group of scholars argued that many of the regula-
tions issued by the U.S. government failed cost-benefit analy-
sis.52  In several of these papers, the scholars pointed out that
agencies often justified regulations based on unquantified ben-
48 See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A
PRIMER 1 (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AAZ4-9SXR]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 9, at 1–3. R
49 See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (“[E]xecutive orders without specific foundation in congressional action are
not judicially enforceable in private civil suits.”).
50 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 33, at 80–87. R
51 See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (holding
that the EPA was permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in the face of an ambigu-
ous statute).
52 See ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
32 (2000); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved
Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 80 (2008); Robert W. Hahn, Regula-
tory Reform: What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND
LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 208, 208 (Robert W. Hahn
ed., 1996); John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 REG. 25, 29–34 (1986);
Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RE-
SULTS FROM REGULATION, supra, at 167.
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efits.53  If these unquantified benefits are assumed to be zero,
then the regulations were not cost-justified.  The most recent
study, published in 2007, confirms that regulators frequently
fail to fully monetize all of the claimed benefits of regulations.54
For example, in a well-known paper, Robert Hahn compiled
a dataset of 136 regulations.55  Hahn assigned a zero benefit to
dozens of regulations because the agencies that issued them
did not provide a monetary value for the benefits.56  The regula-
tions included rules requiring oil tankers to have double hulls,
protecting agricultural workers from toxic pesticides, and limit-
ing toxic pollutants in drinking water.  While it is possible that
each of these regulations produced zero net benefits, it is hard
to believe that they did not produce any benefits at all, as
Richard Parker has pointed out.57
Consider, for example, the EPA’s 1995 municipal waste
combustor rule.58  The regulation was designed to reduce a
range of dangerous emissions—including particulate matter,
acid gases, nitrogen oxide, dioxin, cadmium, mercury, and
lead.  However, the EPA believed that it was possible to assign
valuations to reductions of only the first three substances.
While it was known that dioxin, cadmium, mercury, and lead
are dangerous when ingested, the EPA did not have data that
permitted it to estimate monetized benefits of reduced exposure
to them.59  For that reason, Hahn simply disregarded the bene-
fits of these rules.60  Parker responds persuasively that it would
have been wrong for the EPA to disregard these benefits be-
cause it is clear that they are not zero.61
53 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S.
Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192, 200
(2007) (noting that the “estimation of benefits lags well behind the estimation of
costs”); Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits (2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (finding similar results).
54 See id. at 200–01.
55 Hahn did estimate benefits for some regulations for which the agency did
not. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the
Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2004).
56 See id.
57 Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1382
(2003).
58 See generally Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and
Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Municipal Waste Combustors, 60 Fed.
Reg. 65,387, 65,387–88 (Dec. 19, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
59 EPA, supra note 3, at ES–9, ES–10 tbl.ES–5, ES–11 to ES–13 tbl.ES–6, R
1–5.
60 Hahn, supra note 55, at 1037. R
61 Parker, supra note 57, at 1393–94. R
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In response to Parker’s criticisms, Hahn argues that “there
is no simple alternative for filling gaps in an agency’s analy-
sis.”62 He continues:
In short, I think it is not unreasonable to assign a zero dollar
value to unquantified benefits and cost categories for three
reasons.  First, it gives regulatory agencies an incentive to
provide more information on quantifiable benefits and costs.
Second, any other assumption seems totally arbitrary in the
absence of information on the actual non-quantified benefits
and costs.  Third, the measure of quantifiable net benefits
should be used in conjunction with nonquantifiable benefits
and costs to reach a decision.  Exactly how is a matter of
some debate.63
There are problems with each one of these responses.  If it is
expensive or impossible for regulators to obtain adequate infor-
mation, then there is no point in giving them an incentive to do
so.  Moreover, as we will argue, the assumption that unquanti-
fied benefits are worth zero is less justified than using a subjec-
tive prior.  Finally, the argument that a regulator may disregard
a cost-benefit analysis by citing unquantified benefits just gives
away the game.  Hahn cannot claim that regulators acted
wrongly if he believes that they are permitted to do this.
Yet, there is some common ground between Parker and
Hahn.  In his discussion of the EPA’s municipal waste combus-
tor rule, Parker says:
However, EPA shares a measure of blame for the omission.
While EPA devotes several pages to documenting the toxicity
of heavy metals and dioxins in the abstract, nowhere (not
even in the two-hundred-page Economic Impact Assessment
buried in its docket room) does EPA address the fundamen-
tal, priority-setting questions facing risk managers in that
rule: (1) Are current levels of emissions of heavy metal and
dioxin creating a significant human health or ecosystem
risk?  (2) What portion of total emissions, and total risk from
emissions, is accounted for by hazardous waste combustors?
While it may be unfair (given data limitations) to ask for
numbers in response to these questions, surely courts,
policymakers, and the public are entitled to some explana-
tion of why agency risk managers deem emissions from waste
combustors a significant risk.  We are left with a record that
fails to fully prove the rationality of the rule.64
62 Hahn, supra note 55, at 1037. R
63 Id. at 1037–38.
64 Parker, supra note 57, at 1394. R
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Parker agrees with Hahn that a regulator acts wrongly by fail-
ing to disclose or compile relevant information about the ex-
pected effect of the regulation on emissions and human health.
But Parker’s statement is as puzzling as Hahn’s.  Suppose the
EPA stated that current emissions of heavy metal and dioxin
threaten human health “substantially” or “significantly.”  Is
this sufficient?  Affected parties would be justified in asking the
EPA why a certain risk is substantial, and it is hard to see how
the EPA could answer this question without quantifying the
risk.  Parker does not seem to think the EPA should be required
to provide “numbers,” but why not?  And if the answer is that
there is not enough data, then what exactly did the EPA do
wrong in the first place?
II
UNQUANTIFIED BENEFITS
We turn now to the practice of regulators.  Our goal is to
provide a systematic analysis of unquantified benefits in cost-
benefit analysis.  As we noted above, several scholars have con-
ducted large-scale studies of agency regulations.65  However,
none of these studies focused on the rate at which agencies fail
to quantify benefits or their reasons for failing to do so.66  Those
papers were concerned instead with whether the regulations
passed a cost-benefit test.  In this Part, we take up the issue of
nonquantification directly.  In the sections that follow, we ex-
amine the extent to which agencies fail to quantify costs and
benefits, the reasons they give for failing to do so, and the
extent to which agency practices differ.  We then focus briefly
on the particular issue of unquantified costs.
A. The Extent of Nonquantification
We collected every major regulation issued by every regula-
tory agency from 2010 through 2013.67  This included a total of
65 See sources cited supra note 52. R
66 The most closely related study is Hahn & Dudley, supra note 53, at R
199–203.  Using a sample of regulations drawn from the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton administrations, the authors tabulate the number of regulations with
fully and partially quantified costs and benefits.  This is similar to the initial step
in our analysis of Obama administration regulations, which we describe in Table
1, infra.  Hahn & Dudley do not consider any of the other issues we address below,
including analyzing the reasons for agency quantification or non-quantification,
differences in behavior across agencies, and the extent to which quantification
would appear possible.
67 OMB defines a major regulation as one that is expected to have an eco-
nomic impact in excess of $100 million. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 9, R
at 41.
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106 major rules, promulgated by fourteen agencies, including
some cases in which two agencies worked in tandem.  Agencies
were able to fully quantify the regulatory costs and benefits in
only two of these 106 regulations.  There were forty-eight other
regulations in which agencies were able to partially quantify
both costs and benefits, meaning that the agency calculated
some (nonzero) costs and benefits while nonetheless acknowl-
edging that its calculations were incomplete.  In fifty-six of the
regulations, the agency was unable to attach any number to
either costs or benefits (or both).  Of those fifty-six regulations,
thirty-six involved entirely unquantified benefits, nine involved
entirely unquantified costs, and eleven involved both unquan-
tified benefits and costs.  Table 1 summarizes these findings.
TABLE 1. REGULATIONS BY EXTENT OF QUANTIFICATION
OF BENEFITS AND COSTS.
Partly quantified costs and benefits 48
Did not quantify benefits 36
Did not quantify costs 9
Did not quantify benefits and costs 11
Those numbers, viewed in isolation, appear to paint a
dismal picture of agency behavior.  Agencies are operating
despite a dearth of information, and in many cases the
uncertainty that surrounds their actions might be causing (or
allowing) them to regulate in ways that do not result in net
social benefits.  To be sure, in forty-four of the forty-eight
regulations with partially quantified costs and benefits, the
calculated benefits exceed the costs.  And only in four cases—
three regulations promulgated by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and one by the EPA—did an agency
promulgate a regulation where the known costs exceed the
known benefits.68  Moreover, in three of these four cases, the
agency issued the regulation not because it believed that the
68 See Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier
Operations, 78 Fed. Reg. 42324, 42326–27 tbl.2 (July 15, 2013) (codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 61, 121, 135, 141 & 142); Automatic Dependent Surveillance—
Broadcast (ADS–B) Out Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control
(ATC) Service, 75 Fed. Reg. 30160, 30163 (May 28, 2010) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
91); Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida’s Lakes and Flowing Waters,
75 Fed. Reg. 75762, 75802–03, 75803 tbl.VI(F)(a) (Dec. 6, 2010) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 131); Positive Train Control Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 59108 (Sept. 27,
2010) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 236); FED. R.R. ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., FRA-
2006-0132, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 1 (2009), https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/
Details/L01344 [https://perma.cc/A5B8-MWS8].
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regulation would be cost-justified if the unquantified benefits
were included, which is necessarily speculative, but because
the agency was obligated to regulate by statute.  Still, the
overall record is grim: regulatory agencies are regulating in the
dark.
The DOT’s 2013 regulation of Pilot Certification and
Qualification Requirements is illustrative.69  The regulation
required all commercial airline pilots, including pilots who were
second in command of an airplane, to obtain an Airline
Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate that required 1500 hours of
flying time.70  (Prior regulations only required that pilots in
command of an airplane obtain such a certificate.)71  The DOT
admitted that the regulation would produce relatively few
safety benefits but significant costs, mainly to the pilots who
were forced to undergo additional training.  It estimated that
the regulation would produce $23 million in benefits via
avoided accidents.72  The FAA calculated the likely costs at
$312.7 million, predominantly in the form of additional
expenditures (both time and money) by pilots seeking
certification.73  (There were some unquantified benefits, but the
agency believed them to be relatively small.)74  However, as the
DOT explained, this regulatory change was mandated by a
federal statute—the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Extension Act of 2010.75  The agency explained that the costs
were “statutory costs” and noted that “the costs associated
with the requirement for [second in command pilots] to have an
ATP certificate are attributable to the statute, not to this
regulation.”76  The agency’s hands were tied.
Another DOT regulation, this one governing railroad
control systems, was similarly mandated by the Railroad Safety
Improvement Act of 2008.77  And a 2011 EPA regulation
governing water quality in Florida was initiated by a citizen suit
against the EPA brought by environmental groups.78  In both
69 See generally Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air
Carrier Operations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42324.
70 Id. at 42362, 42368.
71 See id. at 42324.
72 Id. at 42359.
73 Id. at 42327 tbl.2.
74 Id. at 42364.
75 See id.
76 Id. at 42326.
77 See generally Positive Train Control Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 59108, 59108
(Sept. 27, 2010) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 236).
78 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(b) (2011); EPA, 820-F-12-056, PROPOSED NUTRIENTS
STANDARDS FOR FLORIDA’S STREAMS AND PROPOSED DOWNSTREAM PROTECTION VALUES
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cases, the agencies stated plainly that they would not have
regulated absent these obligations.
As for the regulations without any quantifiable benefits,
one important point is that regulations with unquantified
benefits were either relatively low-cost or compelled by statute.
Recall that there were thirty-six regulations in our sample for
which an agency quantified at least some costs but could not
quantify any benefits.  These regulations averaged roughly
$150 million in costs (per regulation).79  By comparison, the
forty-eight regulations for which the EPA quantified both costs
and benefits—and for which benefits outweighed costs in
nearly all cases—averaged approximately $750 million in costs
(per regulation).  In addition, among all of the regulations with
unquantified benefits, the two regulations with the greatest
costs involved implementations of the Affordable Care Act.  One
was a 2013 regulation that involved the administration of
expanded Medicaid programs and children’s health insurance;
this regulation was expected to produce a cost of slightly more
than $1 billion.80  The other was a 2012 regulation dealing with
the establishment and administration of federal and state
insurance exchanges.  This regulation was expected to carry a
cost of $3.4 billion over five years.81  The Department of Health
and Human Services did not attempt to calculate the
regulatory benefits because it did not believe it could separate
the benefits of these particular regulations from the benefits of
the Affordable Care Act as a whole.82
FOR LAKES 1 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/
documents/factsheet-remand-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/GU7J-CDZS].  That
rule was later withdrawn when Florida promulgated its own environmental
regulations governing the same waterways. See Water Quality Standards for the
State of Florida’s Lakes and Flowing Waters; Withdrawal, 79 Fed. Reg. 57447,
57447 (Sept. 25, 2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
79 That figure excludes four regulations that had negative costs.  When a
regulation that is no longer cost-benefit justified is repealed, the agency typically
records the benefits of repeal as negative costs, rather than positive benefits.
When those four regulations are included, the average cost falls to roughly $100
million.
80 Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: Essential Health
Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and Appeal
Processes, and Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: Eligibility and
Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42160, 42298 tbl.4 (July 15, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447, & 457; 45 C.F.R. pts. 155 & 156).
81 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges
and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg.
18310, 18441 tbl.1 (Mar. 27, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–57).
82 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT; ESTABLISHMENT OF EXCHANGES AND QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS, EXCHANGE
STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYERS (CMS-9989-FWP) AND STANDARDS RELATED TO
REINSURANCE, RISK CORRIDORS AND RISK ADJUSTMENT (CMS-9975-F) 11–12 (2012),
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B. Explanations for Nonquantification
In more than 74% of the regulations in our data, the
agency stated that it could not quantify all of the relevant bene-
fits or costs because of empirical uncertainty—missing data,
modeling difficulties, or other related effects.  There were only
nine regulations in which the agency claimed that a benefit or
cost was not quantifiable as a matter of principle.  Table 2
summarizes these statistics:
TABLE 2.  FREQUENCY OF AGENCY EXPLANATIONS FOR FAILURE
TO QUANTIFY BENEFITS AND COSTS.
Explanation Frequency
Empirical uncertainty 77
Benefit/cost is not quantifiable in principle 9
Other 14
No explanation provided 10
*Note: numbers do not sum to 106 because in some cases an agency
provided multiple rationales.
Of the nine regulations for which the agency declared that
the benefit was unquantifiable in principle, six involved
arguments by the agency that the benefits included
“values . . . including equity, human dignity, fairness, and
distributive impacts”83 that could not be quantified.  Yet in all
of these cases, the agency expected the regulation to produce
significant market-related benefits that the agency could and
should have calculated.  For instance, in 2011 the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated a
regulation that expanded the conditions under which
employees could be classified as disabled and receive
reasonable accommodations under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.84  The regulation was expected to produce
dignitary benefits to certain employees who, the agency
believed, would no longer face discrimination.  But those were
not the only benefits the agency expected the regulation to
yield.  In addition, the EEOC speculated that employees who
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/hie3r-ria-032012.
pdf [https://perma.cc/488Z-BTZW].  These two regulations were also mandated
by statute, and the Department of Health and Human Services had no choice but
to promulgate them.
83 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 102-03 (2012).
84 See generally Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978,
16978–79 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
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received accommodations might become more productive and
that employers would benefit by retaining employees who
would otherwise quit.  One commenter supplied dollar
estimates of this benefit, citing research indicating that
reasonable accommodations could be worth between $1,000
and $5,500 per worker.85  Yet the agency did not attempt to
quantify any of these benefits or measure them against the
costs.  (We discuss this regulation in greater detail below.)
Similarly, in 2013 the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a
regulation prohibiting discrimination in employment against
particular categories of military veterans.86  The agency
invoked Executive Order 13,563 and explained that its
“analysis of the benefits of this proposal emphasizes the non-
monetary benefits,” including “values that are difficult or
impossible to quantify, including equity.”87  Executive Order
13,563 does instruct agencies to include benefits such as
equity, human dignity, and fairness in their analyses, even
when those benefits are difficult or impossible to quantify.
However, the benefits that the DOL ascribes to this regulation
are straightforward.  The DOL argued that the rule will
“facilitate the connection of job-seeking veterans with
contractors looking to hire” and that it “provides increased
tools with which the contractor can assess its affirmative
action efforts.”88  These benefits, and the few others listed, are
not the type of inchoate goods that the quoted language from
Executive Order 13,563 contemplated.  To the contrary, they
are labor market advantages that the DOL should have been
able to quantify.  Yet the agency makes no effort to do so,
instead concluding: “[The DOL] believes that the final rule will
have extensive benefits for veterans who are prospective and
current employees of Federal contractors and Federal
contractors.  As such, [the DOL] concludes that the benefits of
the rule justify the costs.”89  Four other regulations followed
the same template.90
85 Id. at 16996.
86 See generally Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of
Contractors and Subcontractors Regarding Special Disabled Veterans, Veterans
of the Vietnam Era, Disabled Veterans, Recently Separated Veterans, Active Duty
Wartime or Campaign Badge Veterans, and Armed Forces Service Medal
Veterans, 78 Fed. Reg. 58614, 58614 (Sept. 24, 2013) (codified at 41 C.F.R. pts.
60–250 & 60–300).
87 Id. at 58656 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. at 216).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See generally National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to
Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37106, 37106 (June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.
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While it is tempting to argue that any regulation dealing
with disabled people or veterans must involve nonquantifiable
benefits, we believe that the agencies’ invocation of boilerplate
language from Executive Order 13,563 is precisely what must
be avoided.  Some benefits like human dignity might well be
monetizable, as we argue below.  But even if they are not, the
agency should still conduct a cost-benefit analysis that takes
into account all the monetizable benefits.  It should then
separately state that the regulation should be issued because
of identified dignitary benefits, even if it fails a cost-benefit
analysis.  With respect to equity and distributive impacts, the
agency should also conduct a cost-benefit analysis and explain
that the regulation should be issued because of the distributive
impacts, even though it fails a cost-benefit analysis.
Moreover, the analysis of distributive impacts should be
rigorous rather than conclusory.  The DOL should have
actually explained how the rule would advance equity by
estimating the impact of the rule on the wealth of veterans.91
Such an estimate would not have been difficult to provide.  The
DOL possesses information about the income and employment
rate of classes of veterans.92  Indeed, according to this
information, veterans have, on average, a lower unemployment
rate and higher median income than nonveterans do.93  This
strongly suggests that a program that generically helps
veterans may well have perverse distributive impacts unless it
is carefully designed to help veterans who are the least well-off.
If the DOL cannot demonstrate that the distributive impacts
are positive, then it should not be able to cite distributive
values as a reason for issuing the regulation.
In other cases, the regulations were promulgated to
implement the Affordable Care Act, and the agency explained
115); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56164, 56164 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35);
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56236, 56236–37 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at
28 C.F.R. pt. 36); Medical Examination of Aliens—Removal of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection from Definition of Communicable Disease
of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg. 56547, 5551 (Nov. 2, 2009) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 34) (noting reduction in “stigma of HIV-infected persons”).
91 We are not arguing that the valuations used in the cost-benefit analysis
should be given distributional weights, as has sometimes been advocated.  We
argue that the distributive impact should be calculated separately from the cost-
benefit analysis.
92 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE VETERAN LABOR FORCE IN THE RECOVERY 2, 2
tbl.1 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/VeteransLaborForce/
VeteransLaborForce.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JV5-9CTL].
93 See id. at 2, 2 tbl.2.
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that it was impossible—both practically and as a matter of
principle—to separate the benefits created by the particular
regulation at hand from the benefits of the larger statute.  This
was the issue with respect to two regulations issued in 2013 by
the Department of Health and Human Services: one to
establish guidelines for coverage of essential health benefits94
and another to set standards related to the expansions of
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Programs.95
The last case comes from a 2010 Department of the
Treasury regulation governing the manner in which agencies
disburse benefits to citizens.96  The regulation required all
individuals receiving benefits from federal agencies to receive
payment of those benefits via electronic funds transfer—that
is, direct deposit.  Among the unquantifiable costs of this
regulation, the agency included “intangible emotional costs for
individuals who are fearful or resistant to direct deposit.”97
We do not think that these costs would be difficult to
quantify.  There are numerous ways to determine how much an
individual might value not having to receive direct deposits.
The agency might calculate how much time and money the
typical individual spends in order to use her preferred
nondirect method of deposit—mailing letters, going to the
bank, etc.  (This is a type of revealed preference analysis.98)
Alternatively, the agency might simply ask people how much
additional money they would need to be offered to accept direct
deposit in lieu of their current deposit method (a stated
preference approach).99  The fact that the benefits are
“emotional” does not mean that they are unmeasurable.  We
suspect that the agency simply believed that the benefits were
94 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards
Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 12834, 12834 (Feb. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, & 156).
95 See generally Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs:
Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair
Hearing and Appeal Processes, and Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges:
Eligibility and Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42160, 42160 (July 15, 2013) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447, & 457; 45 C.F.R. pts. 155 & 156).
96 See generally Management of Federal Agency Disbursements, 75 Fed. Reg.
80315, 80315 (Dec. 22, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 208).
97 Id. at 80330.
98 See Eric P. Kroes & Robert J. Sheldon, Stated Preference Methods: An
Introduction, 22 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 11, 12–16 (1988) (explaining the
difference between stated preference methods and revealed preferences); see also
Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15
ECONOMICA 243, 243–51 (1948) (offering a proof for the economic theory of revealed
preferences).
99 See Kroes & Sheldon, supra note 98, at 12–16. R
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too small to be worth measuring; the benefits might have been
exceeded by the cost of performing a study to calculate them.  If
this was its reason, the agency should have said so.
In contrast to the few regulations where an agency claimed
that a particular benefit or cost was unquantifiable in
principle, there are seventy-seven regulations in our dataset in
which an agency announces that it lacks the empirical
information necessary to make such a calculation.  There are a
wide variety of types of unquantified benefits and costs across
those seventy-seven regulations, but an examination of the
regulations reveals several patterns.
First, in some cases it appears that the unquantified
benefits could be quite large.  One example is a 2010 regulation
issued by the Department of the Interior imposing increased
safety measures for deepwater oil and gas drilling in the wake
of the BP oil spill.100  The only asserted benefit of the new safety
measures was the prevention of another catastrophic oil spill,
but the agency did not offer an estimate of this benefit.  It noted
that there had been 4,123 deepwater wells drilled but only one
catastrophic spill (the BP spill), and so it estimated the
probability of a catastrophic spill at 1 in 4,123 for any new well
that is being drilled.101  (This raises the question of why the
agency was not considering the benefits of avoiding
noncatastrophic spills as well.)  However, the agency could not
estimate the reduced probability of such a spill from the safety
measures it was implementing.  It noted a Canadian Energy
Board study that estimated risk reductions from similar
(though not identical) safety measures but then announced
that it lacked “sufficient data that would allow adapting that
methodology to the change in the probability of blowout
associated with . . . this rulemaking.”102  In addition to its
inability to calculate the reduced probability of a spill, the
100 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—
Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental
Shelf, 75 Fed. Reg. 63346, 63346 (Oct. 14, 2010) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
101 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR THE INTERIM
FINAL RULE ON INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF: RIN 1010 AD68 7 (2010).  This calculation is pretty
questionable.  A better approach would have taken into account the number of
years the wells have been in operation and calculated the annual probability of a
catastrophic spill.  If the wells had different characteristics relevant to the risk of a
spill (location, manner of construction, types of safety features, etc.), then these
different characteristics should have been accounted for as well.
102 Id. at 19.
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agency did not estimate the economic benefits of avoiding a
spill.103
Second, when agencies are unable to fully calculate a
benefit, they almost never produce all of the information
available to them and hazard a best guess.  In the vast majority
of cases, the agency will simply announce that the benefit
cannot be calculated, explain the reason, and provide no
further information.  The Department of Interior’s regulation of
offshore oil drilling safety provides one example of this: after
concluding that it could not estimate the marginal safety
benefit of the regulation, the agency did not provide an
estimate of the benefit of preventing such a spill.104
The efforts by various agencies to regulate the emission of
mercury and mercury compounds are similarly illustrative.  In
2011, the Department of Energy promulgated a trio of
regulations setting energy efficiency standards for air
conditioners, furnaces, refrigerators, clothes dryers, and other
home appliances.105  Higher-efficiency appliances use less
energy and reduce the burning of fossil fuels needed to produce
that energy.  The agency’s cost-benefit analysis thus includes
reductions in pollution due to electrical power generation.
These pollutants include carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
mercury.  The DOE calculated the monetary value of the
reduction in carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, but
it could not calculate the monetary value of the reduction in
mercury emissions.106  The DOE was able to estimate the
reduction in emissions—for instance, the regulation governing
103 There is no indication why the agency did not try.  As of February 2013, the
costs to BP from its catastrophic oil spill totaled $42.2 billion. See Agustino
Fontevecchia, BP Fighting a Two Front War as Macondo Continues to Bite and
Production Drops, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013, 11:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/afontevecchia/2013/02/05/bp-fighting-a-two-front-war-as-macondo-
continues-to-bite-and-production-drops/#55016e602b87 [https://perma.cc/
2XAN-5UMP].  Because BP was being forced to internalize the costs of the spill to
the extent possible, this seems a reasonable estimate of the total economic impact
of the event.
104 See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 101, at 19. R
105 See generally Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
Standards for Residential Furnaces and Residential Central Air Conditioners and
Heat Pumps, 76 Fed. Reg. 67037, 67037 (Oct. 31, 2011) (codified at 10 C.F.R pt.
430); Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
Residential Refrigerators, Refrigerator-Freezers, and Freezers, 76 Fed. Reg.
57516, 57516 (Sept. 15, 2011) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430); Energy
Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Clothes
Dryers and Room Air Conditioners, 76 Fed. Reg. 22454, 22454 (Apr. 21, 2011)
(codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
106 DEP’T OF ENERGY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR THE FINAL RULE ON
RESIDENTIAL REFRIGERATORS, REFRIGERATOR-FREEZERS AND FREEZERS 1–2 tbl.1.2.1, 2-
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clothes dryers and air conditioners would reduce mercury
emissions by 0.073 tons.107  However, it provided no
information beyond that figure.  The DOE explained in a
footnote that it was “aware of multiple agency efforts to
determine the appropriate range of values used in evaluating
the potential economic benefits of reduced Hg emissions.”108
However, it had “decided to await further guidance regarding
consistent valuation and reporting of Hg emissions before it
once again monetizes Hg emissions reductions in its
rulemakings.”109  The Department of Energy did not provide
any preliminary results from these studies; it did not offer a
guess or a rough estimate as to the eventual outcome of these
studies; and it did not even name the agencies involved in these
efforts to quantify mercury benefits.
The following year, the EPA promulgated the mercury
regulation we described in the introduction.110  This regulation
was directed at mercury emissions in particular.  By this point,
the EPA had assembled some data on the benefits of limiting
mercury emissions, but those data were very sparse.  The EPA
had estimated only the neurologic benefits (avoiding loss of IQ)
to children who were exposed to mercury through
“recreationally caught freshwater fish.”111  The EPA could not
quantify other neurologic effects (effects on memory, for
instance); other non-neurologic health effects such as
improved cardiovascular health; decreased mortality from
mercury toxicity; or even benefits to children who were exposed
to mercury through channels other than recreationally caught
freshwater fish.112  It also did not estimate the monetary value
of environmental benefits that did not directly impact human
life or health.113  Like the DOE regulations from the previous
year, the EPA did not venture any guesses—or offer any
15 (2011), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/pdfs/
refrig_finalrule_tsd.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5LE-XW6G].
107 Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
Residential Clothes Dryers and Room Air Conditioners, 76 Fed. Reg. at 22457.
108 Id. at 22457 n.3.
109 Id.
110 See generally National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating
Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).
111 EPA, supra note 3, at ES–1, ES–11 tbl.ES–5. R
112 Id. at ES–11 tbl.ES–5.
113 Id. at ES–12 tbl.ES–6.
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additional information—regarding the benefits that were not
fully quantified.114
The third pattern that emerges from the regulations is that
agencies often justify their failure to quantify benefits based on
lack of data even though agencies could fund studies to collect
that data.  One example is a 2013 Health and Human Services
(HHS) regulation on the labeling of gluten-free foods.115  The
primary benefit of the regulation was that it would aid people
with celiac disease in selecting and consuming gluten-free
foods.  However, the agency was not able to fully quantify the
benefits of the regulation—and there was significant
uncertainty surrounding the benefits it did quantify—because
it had no data on what fraction of food eaten by a typical person
with celiac disease is labeled as gluten-free.  (If the consumer
does not pay attention to the label, the regulation is irrelevant.)
If the typical consumer eats a high proportion of foods labeled
gluten-free, the regulation—which would clarify and enforce
those standards—might have significant benefits.  If
consumers eat only a small fraction of such foods, the
regulation would produce only meager benefits.  HHS
explained that it could only guess at this number because no
studies existed.  But the agency could have conducted its own
survey of consumer behavior, and in fact the agency had
conducted many other similar surveys of related consumer
behavior for this and other regulations.
Another example is a 2013 regulation by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) governing the rules that individuals
114 EPA’s treatment of mercury’s benefits has become a major legal issue for
the agency.  A number of state and private petitioners have challenged the EPA’s
rule, arguing that the agency should have considered that the rule’s costs
dramatically outweigh its benefits. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699,
2702–06 (2015).  EPA estimated that the annual costs of the rule would be $9.6
billion and the benefits of mercury reduction would be only about $0.005 billion.
See EPA, supra note 3, at ES–1.  The EPA estimated that the rule would produce R
approximately $37 to $90 billion in total benefits, the vast majority of which were
attributable to reductions in particulate matter emissions. See id. But because
the rule is targeted at mercury emissions in particular, petitioners have argued
that the benefit-cost ratio for mercury is of special importance.  See Brief for
Petitioners State of Michigan, et al. at 47–48, Michigan vs. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699
(2015) (Nos. 14–46. 14-47, 14-49).
115 See generally Food Labeling; Gluten-Free Labeling of Foods, 78 Fed. Reg.
47154, 47154 (Aug. 5, 2013) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); FDA, FDA-2005-N-
0404 FOOD LABELING; GLUTEN-FREE LABELING OF FOODS: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS 15-18 (2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Reports
ManualsForms/Reports/EconomicAnalyses/UCM363530.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C64M-F53Z].
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must follow when obtaining a visa.116  Prior to this regulation,
noncitizens living in the United States were obligated to leave
the United States while waiting for their visas to be processed
or renewed.  The DHS regulation changed the rule to allow
noncitizens to remain in the country pending the processing of
their visas, so long as the noncitizen was living with immediate
relatives who were themselves American citizens.  The
regulation’s benefit was in avoiding the disruption—emotional
and financial—to the visa applicant’s U.S. relatives if the
applicant was forced to live abroad while waiting for her visa.
However, the agency claimed that it could not quantify this
benefit because it was “currently unable to estimate the
average duration of time an immediate relative must spend
abroad while awaiting waiver adjudication under the current
process.”117  This strikes us as implausible; does DHS not keep
statistics on its average visa processing time?  And even if such
statistics were not available, couldn’t the agency have
conducted a short survey to determine the average wait time?
Finally, there were a number of regulations in which the
agency calculated the number of lives the regulation would
save but could not quantify the regulation’s morbidity
benefits—the value of avoiding nonfatal diseases and other
medical conditions.118  This continues a trend we observed in
prior work.119  There, we found that agencies—including the
EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)—regularly claim to be unable to quantify nonfatal
regulatory health benefits such as prevented cases of
bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma.  It is strange that
agencies attach valuations to loss of life but not to illness,
especially given that studies quantifying the costs of nonfatal
diseases and health conditions certainly exist.120  If agencies
116 See generally Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for
Certain Immediate Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 536, 536 (Jan. 3, 2013) (codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 103 & 212).
117 Id. at 574.
118 See, e.g., Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards
for Residential Clothes Washers, 77 Fed. Reg. 32308, 32310 (May 31, 2012)
(codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 429 & 430) (calculating benefits from reduced pollution-
related deaths because of greater energy efficiency but ignoring morbidity
benefits).
119 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 657, 701 (2010).
120 See, e.g., Nattavudh Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different
Price Tags on the Same Health Condition: Re-evaluating the Well-Being Valuation
Approach, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 1032, 1038 tbl.3 (2011) (monetizing the value of
avoiding nonfatal health issues).
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have some reason for ignoring these studies or distrusting their
findings, they have not revealed it.
C. Agency-by-Agency Data
Our data also reveal significant differences between agen-
cies in the extent to which they quantify benefits and costs.
Seven different agencies are responsible for the fifty regulations
promulgated between 2010 and 2013 in which the agency was
able to fully or partially quantify both costs and benefits.  How-
ever, the agencies differ widely in their contributions to this
total. The EPA (thirteen regulations), DOE (ten regulations),
and Department of Transportation (thirteen regulations, in-
cluding three issued jointly with the EPA) together account for
thirty-five of the fifty regulations (70%) in our data.  By con-
trast, there were twelve agencies that produced at least one
regulation among the fifty-six regulations in which either bene-
fits or costs (or both) were not quantified at all.  Here too our
data are dominated by a few agencies.  The Department of
Health and Human Services produced twenty-two regulations
in which either costs or benefits were quantified, including six
that were promulgated jointly with the Department of Labor.
The Department of the Interior was responsible for ten more,
and in combination the two agencies represent thirty-two of the
fifty-six regulations (57%) in our data.
In Table 3 below, we categorize each rule by the agency
promulgating the rule and the extent to which the agency
quantified the benefits and costs involved.
What accounts for the broad discrepancies in agency-by-
agency practices?  In part they are an artifact of the types of
regulations the agencies are promulgating and the statutes
under which the agencies are operating.  For instance, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services issued a number of
regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act, and as we
noted above, the costs and benefits of such regulations are
difficult or impossible to calculate separate from the statutes
themselves.  Similarly, as we explained above, several of the
Department of Labor’s regulations implement employment an-
tidiscrimination rules (as does the EEOC’s lone regulation),
and these regulations produce dignity- and equity-related ben-
efits that agencies refuse to quantify.
In other cases, however, there appear to be significant dif-
ferences among agencies in their facility with cost-benefit anal-
ysis and access to data and modeling.  For instance, the
Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and EPA
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TABLE 3.  REGULATIONS BY AGENCY AND DEGREE OF
QUANTIFICATION.
Number of Regulations
Agency Fully Partially No No No
quantified quantified quantified quantified quantified
benefits and benefits and benefits costs benefits or
costs costs costs
Agriculture 4
Education 2
EEOC 1
Energy 10
EPA 13 3 3
EPA &
3
Transportation
Health and
Human 1 5 11 5
Services
HHS, Labor,
5 1
and Treasury
Homeland
1 1
Security
Housing and
Urban 1
Development
Interior 2 8
Justice 3 1
Labor 4 4
Office of
Personnel 1
Management
Transportation 1 9
Treasury 1 1 1
Total: 2 48 36 9 11
have long employed cost-benefit analysis and have accumu-
lated a significant quantity of data (and developed a broad set
of useful models).  In particular, regulations that affect the
burning of fossil fuels draw on numerous existing studies.121
Other agencies, by contrast, appear to be novices to cost-
benefit analysis.  The Department of Agriculture promulgated
four regulations in our sample and quantified benefits for none
of them.  The benefits from these regulations are not obscure,
either.  Two of the regulations set school lunch nutrition stan-
121 See, e.g., Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards
for Residential Clothes Washers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 32353–57  (describing extensive
EPA and DOE research on harm from emissions).
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dards and were expected to provide benefits by improving chil-
dren’s health.122  Another regulation mandated country-of-
origin labeling on food, which would provide consumers with
additional purchasing information.123  Not only do the benefits
of such labels seem quantifiable, there are existing studies as-
sessing U.S. consumer willingness to pay for country-of-origin
labels.124  The fourth regulation was directed internally, at the
U.S. Farm Service Agency, and relaxed the terms under which
that subagency is required to purchase sugar from U.S. farm-
ers.125  The regulation is expected to produce cost savings both
for the federal government and for biofuel producers.  Despite
the fact that these benefits would seem straightforward to
quantify, the agency refused to put a number on them.
The lagging agencies should adopt the cost-benefit prac-
tices of the leading agencies.  OIRA is ideally positioned to per-
form this type of centralizing function and educate agencies in
the practice of CBA.126  The economists at OIRA could also aid
agencies in gathering and analyzing the data necessary for CBA
where those data do not already exist.
D. Unquantified Costs
To this point we have focused on unquantified regulatory
benefits.  Unquantified costs call for separate treatment.  As
Table 1 indicates, there are only nine regulations in our data in
which an agency quantified some benefits but entirely failed to
quantify costs, in comparison to thirty-six regulations in which
an agency quantified costs but not benefits.  (There were eleven
122 See National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program: Nutri-
tion Standards for All Foods Sold in School as Required by the Healthy, Hunger-
Free Kids Act of 2010, 78 Fed. Reg. 39068, 39068 (June 28, 2013) (codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 210 & 220); Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and
School Breakfast Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4088 (Jan. 26, 2012) (codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 210 & 220).
123 See Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken,
Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural
Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg.
31367, 31367 (May 24, 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 65).
124 See Wendy J. Umberger, Will Consumers Pay a Premium for Country-of-
Origin Labeled Meat?, CHOICES (2004), http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2004-4/
cool/2004-4-04.htm [https://perma.cc/ZAQ7-8TSL].
125 See generally Sugar Program; Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy
Producers, 78 Fed. Reg. 45441, 45441, 45445 (July 29, 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 1435).
126 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the federal gov-
ernment’s central authority for reviewing executive branch regulations. See Exec.
Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-03
(2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012).
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regulations in which an agency did not quantify either.)  Of the
forty-eight regulations in which an agency partially quantified
both benefits and costs—meaning that it assigned a nonzero
number to each—the agency left some costs unquantified in
twenty-eight cases.
Yet few regulations in our dataset involved unquantified
costs of any great magnitude.  In part this is because costs are
typically easier to measure than benefits—if a factory must
install some new type of pollution-reducing scrubber, the
agency can simply compute the cost of installing the scrubber.
Costs often take the form of goods that are priced on markets,
while benefits often do not.127  In addition, regulated entities
themselves are often the source for information regarding regu-
latory costs, and they have incentives to produce information
about those costs.128  If an agency fails to quantify a cost, and a
regulated entity submits a comment supplying an estimate of
that cost (and arguing that the regulation is not cost-benefit
justified), the regulation is not likely to survive judicial review if
the agency fails to take the cost into account.129  In the major-
ity of cases, the unquantified costs were the administrative
costs of implementing or adhering to some new regulatory
scheme—and often these administrative costs would be borne
by the agency itself.  These costs are surely nonzero, but we
suspect that they are unlikely to fall within an order of magni-
tude of the other economic effects of the regulation.  (Recall
that we are only analyzing “significant” regulations with eco-
nomic impacts of $100 million or more.)  Nonetheless, it is
surprising that so many agencies in our data failed to quantify
administrative costs, given that agencies are no strangers to
quantifying the costs of administrative paperwork and have
done so many times.130
The other unquantified costs are a hodgepodge of relatively
small-ticket items.  For instance, two 2013 Department of the
Interior regulations governing migratory bird hunting listed
127 Of course, this is partly because agencies do not count unemployment as a
regulatory cost.  We have argued elsewhere that they should do so. See Jonathan
S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
98 VA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2012).
128 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1580 (2002).
129 The regulation could conceivably be struck down on two separate grounds:
as arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) and for failing to respond
to a comment under United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d
240, 251–53 (2d Cir. 1977).
130 See Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279,
296–300 (2015).
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lost state revenue from “lost . . . hunter expenditures” as the
primary unquantified costs.131  The EEOC regulation imple-
menting aspects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which
we discussed earlier, names the possibility of increased litiga-
tion—to enforce the terms of the regulation—as a possible un-
quantified cost.132  We also previously described the Treasury
regulation requiring direct deposit, which would impose emo-
tional costs on federal benefits recipients who are adverse to
direct deposit.133  The EPA lists some employment costs among
the unquantified costs of a 2011 Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule.134  We have argued elsewhere that agencies should take
unemployment costs into account when performing cost-bene-
fit analysis,135 though even significant unemployment effects
would not likely put a dent in this particular rule—the EPA
projected $120 to $280 billion in annual benefits and only
about $800 million in annual costs.136  Finally, at least one
regulation includes unquantified costs that may actually be
benefits.  In 2010, the Department of Labor promulgated a reg-
ulation mandating greater disclosure of pension plan fees to
participants in the plan.137  The DOL stated that it could not
quantify the costs that would accrue if some employers re-
sponded to the regulation by declining to offer pension plans.  If
employers drop their pension plans because of the administra-
tive burden imposed by the regulation, then that is truly a cost.
But if a plan is dropped because participation falls once em-
131 FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FWS-HQ-MB-2013-0057-0424, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD HUNTING REGULATIONS FOR THE 2013-2014 SEASON 10 (2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FWS-HQ-MB-2013-0057-0424
[https://perma.cc/8SFZ-T43R]; see generally Late Seasons and Bag and Posses-
sion Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds, 78 Fed. Reg. 58204, 58204 (Sept.
23, 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20); Migratory Bird Hunting; Early Seasons
and Bag and Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds in the Contigu-
ous United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, 78 Fed.
Reg. 53200, 53200 (Aug. 28, 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 20).
132 See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978, 16995 (Mar.
25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
133 Management of Federal Agency Disbursements, 75 Fed. Reg. 80315,
80330 (Dec. 22, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 208).
134 See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48208, 48317–19
(Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, & 97).
135 Masur & Posner, supra note 127, at 580. R
136 Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48318.
137 Fiduciary Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual
Account Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 64910, 64933  (October 20, 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-NOV-16 12:37
118 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:87
ployees realize the fees they are being asked to pay, then this
may represent a social benefit instead.
In the end, we cannot know whether agencies have hidden
major costs under the heading of “unquantified” or even failed
to name them at all.  After all, if a regulation causes unemploy-
ment, it is possible that it harms people’s dignity and produces
negative distributive effects.  If these effects should be taken
into account as arguments for regulation, they should be taken
into account as arguments against regulation as well.  But our
regulatory survey has failed to unearth promising candidates.
Given the often adversarial backdrop to agency rulemaking,
this does not come as a significant surprise.  If agencies are
erring by omission and using the lack of quantification to ad-
vance suspect regulation, it is more likely to be occurring on
the benefits side.
Further, it is important to note that we are able to observe
only those regulations that agencies have decided to promul-
gate, not proposed or contemplated regulations that were re-
jected.  There may be many instances in which an agency does
not proceed with a regulation because it has not bothered to
calculate all of the benefits that regulation will provide.  Indeed,
Victor Gilinsky, a former commissioner of the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC), explained to us that the NRC was pre-
viously thought to “stack the deck” against regulation by
refusing to quantify benefits other than effects on human
health.138  We cannot verify this statement, and we cannot ob-
serve agency actions that do not occur.  Nevertheless, it is likely
that the failure to quantify benefits frequently results in under-
regulation.
III
UPDATING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An argument can be made that regulators do not use cost-
benefit analysis properly because they rely heavily on unquan-
tified benefits in order to justify regulations.  As we discussed
in Part II, it is possible that regulators claim unquantified bene-
fits in order to rationalize bad regulations that they seek to
issue for ideological or political reasons.  However, it is also
possible that their behavior is, at least roughly, normatively
defensible.  We sketch below this normative argument and
138 Victor Gilinsky, Former Comm’r of the Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Uni-
versity of Chicago Conference on Federal Agency Decision Making Under Deep
Uncertainty (May 8, 2015) (notes on file with author).
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show that if it is correct, it nonetheless requires significant
reform of agency practice.
A. Static Versus Dynamic Cost-Benefit Analysis
Imagine that a factory begins to use substance X in its
production process, as a result of which workers are exposed to
a small quantity of it.  Substance X is known to produce cancer
in rats that are forced to consume vast amounts of it.  There is
also anecdotal evidence that some human beings who have
been exposed to X later developed cancer, although it is not
known whether the exposure caused the cancer.  No epidemio-
logical studies of X have been performed, in part because until
now X has rarely been used in manufacturing or any other
common process.  Some workers in the factory complain that
they have suffered headaches ever since X was introduced.
A staff member at OSHA recommends that all factories that
use X be required to supply ventilation masks to their workers,
which would cost $1 million.  An economist at OIRA argues
that such a regulation would fail a cost-benefit analysis be-
cause the benefits of the regulation are $0.
We regard such an argument as naı¨ve because it ignores
information about the lab rats, the anecdotes, and the worker
complaints.  More precisely, it ignores the “prior” of the staff
member.  Inspired by Bayes’ Rule, we argue that this is the
wrong approach.139  Imagine that the staff member has worked
at OSHA for decades and over the years has developed an intui-
tive sense of when chemical substances are dangerous and
when they are not.  Perhaps the staff member has learned from
experience that substances frequently thought to be safe have
turned out to be dangerous.  Or perhaps she recognizes that
substances with certain telltale characteristics often turn out
to be dangerous, and X shares those characteristics.  The staff
member may not even be able to articulate her reasons for
believing that X is dangerous, but nonetheless she believes that
it is (though she is not certain).
The staff member has what is known in Bayesian statistics
as a “prior”—an estimate as to the value of some unknown
139 Bayes’ Rule is a formula for updating the probability of an event as new
information becomes available about it.  In practice, Bayesian reasoning assumes
that probability estimates may be based on the personal experience and knowl-
edge of individuals rather than derived from statistical analysis of a large sample
of events. See Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. ECON.
REV. 195, 288–92 (2007).  This estimate is used as a starting point and updated as
new information arises.
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number.140  This prior is more than just a random guess.  It is
the product of the regulator’s experience and intuition, which
provides useful information.  The OIRA economist may be right
that the regulation should not be issued, but she is wrong to
claim that the benefits of the regulation are $0.  If the regula-
tor’s beliefs are sincere, the benefit of the regulation is likely
greater than $0.  The problem is that the regulator has not
articulated her assumptions.  If the regulator does not make
her assumptions explicit, they cannot be tested or updated.
Let us suppose that we force to her to.  Imagine that the
regulator finally says that she believes that 100 workers will be
exposed to the chemical over a certain period of time.  She
thinks there is a 1% probability that a worker will develop
cancer and die.  She also believes that on average half of the
workers will develop ten headaches per year as a result of expo-
sure.  After some further thought, she thinks that the workers
would be willing to pay $20 to avoid the headaches.  Accord-
ingly, she calculates the benefit of the regulation as
$6,010,000, assuming a valuation of statistical life of $6 mil-
lion and ignoring discounting.  Based on this calculation, the
regulation passes a cost-benefit analysis.
Is the number spurious and no better than any other?  We
do not think so—the number is the product of the regulator’s
latent knowledge and expertise.  Moreover, the mandate to esti-
mate numbers—even if they are little more than guesses—has
important institutional value because the numbers provide a
basis for evaluating the regulators’ reliability as additional in-
formation is disclosed later on.  In addition, the numbers also
provide a basis for revisions in light of additional information.
Once a regulatory agency has relied upon a prior, the agency
should update that prior in light of new information.  The up-
dated estimates would then be used in future regulations or
even to revise the original regulation.  The crucial difference
from current practice is that agencies would no longer price
benefits and harms at $0 when they lacked complete statistical
information.  They would offer their best estimates, act on
those estimates, and then update the estimates over time.  We
will discuss the process of updating in greater detail below.
Naı¨vete´ can go in the other direction as well.  Imagine that
the factory decides to use substance Y instead.  Substance Y is
widely believed to be completely harmless.  But one day a
respected epidemiologist publishes a study that finds that Y is
140 See id. at 198–99 (describing and explaining Bayesian statistics).
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associated with a dangerous form of cancer.  The relationship
between Y and cancer is statistically significant at the five per-
cent level.  The economist at OSHA accordingly recommends
that the agency issue a regulation that limits exposure of work-
ers to Y.  However, such a cost-benefit analysis would be naı¨ve.
The reason is that if the OSHA staffer has a strong prior that Y
is harmless, then there is a reasonable chance that the rela-
tionship found in the study is spurious.  After all, one out of
twenty such studies will be wrong; there is also reason to be-
lieve that scientists are biased toward publishing studies with
statistically significant results.141  If the staffer has a strong
enough prior that Y is harmless, then it may be reasonable to
believe that this particular study is one of the wrong ones.
Naı¨vete´ can also affect the cost side.  Environmentalists
have complained that when regulators conduct cost-benefit
analyses, they typically rely on industry data in order to deter-
mine costs.142  Industry data is backward-looking and so does
not take into account that the cost of complying with a regula-
tion—buying and installing scrubbers, for example—is likely to
decline in the future.  The producers of scrubbers may benefit
from economies of scale or technological development as they
respond to increased demand driven by regulatory require-
ments.  With this information, regulators should apply a dis-
count to cost estimates derived from industry data.
We can summarize these comments by distinguishing be-
tween cost-benefit analysis as a procedure and cost-benefit
analysis’ inputs.  As a procedure, cost-benefit analysis merely
directs regulators to issue regulations if the benefits exceed the
costs.  The procedure itself does not direct regulators to use
only certain types of informational inputs such as peer-re-
viewed studies.  Regulators should use all relevant informa-
tional inputs when they conduct cost-benefit analyses, subject
to some qualifications that we discuss below.  This means that
the regulator’s prior should be used rather than disregarded.
The process of repeatedly updating the prior in light of new
information has a dynamic or Bayesian quality that distin-
guishes it from cost-benefit analysis as traditionally
understood.
141 See Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green & David Nickerson, Testing for Publi-
cation Bias in Political Science, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 385, 385, 391 (2001) (explaining
that there is a bias against statistically insignificant studies in political science
and bias against statistically insignificant studies is well documented in psychol-
ogy, medical science, and economics).
142 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 128, at 1580. R
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B. Responses
We can imagine a number of responses to our argument.
The first is that the regulator’s prior is arbitrary; it has no basis
in fact.  If the prior is arbitrary, then it should not be used, and
instead the regulator should assume that any possible effect
that cannot be verified by scientific studies has a probability of
zero.143
The problem with this argument is that the zero probability
is even more arbitrary than the regulator’s prior.  Consider the
risk that the commercialization of drones would cause harm
because some people would use drones to spy on strangers in
their homes.144  The risk of this harm clearly cannot be estab-
lished with a scientific study.  We do not know how often
drones would be used in this way; and we do not know how to
monetize the privacy invasion.  Yet it is clear that the risk and
the harm are greater than zero.  Accordingly, the regulator’s
prior would be greater than zero and it would be arbitrary and
wrong to treat the expected harm as zero.  The regulator should
be forced to quantify the expected harm with the understand-
ing that a very wide range of valuations would be reasonable.
Second, one could argue that there are tiny risks on both
sides of the cost-benefit analysis, and so it is reasonable to
treat them as offsetting.  In the case of drones, for example,
people who use drones might, while spying on strangers, dis-
cover someone who is having a heart attack and call an ambu-
lance, saving that person’s life.  The tiny probability of this
benefit offsets the tiny probability of harm from spying, and
thus we should just treat both probabilities as zero.
This argument is also wrong.  If both probabilities are very
low, then they will not affect the cost-benefit analysis, and in
that sense the critic is right that it would be harmless to treat
both probabilities as zero.  But there is independent value in
forcing the regulator to make explicit her assumptions.  After
the regulation has been in place for a while, we will learn
whether the regulator’s priors were accurate or not.  That pro-
vides important information about the reliability of the regula-
tor.  In addition, the prior will continue to play a role as the
regulator determines posterior probabilities in the light of new
information.  If the regulator is able to collect information
about ambulance calling but not about spying, then the regula-
143 See Hahn, supra note 55, at 1037–38. R
144 See Nicholas Ryan Turza, Dr. Dronelove: How We Should All Learn to Stop
Worrying and Love Commercial Drones, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 319, 360 (2014).
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tor will be able to update its probability estimates about ambu-
lance calling, but it should maintain its prior about spying.
A third worry is that if regulators are allowed to rely on
their subjective priors, then they will be able to rationalize reg-
ulations that they seek to implement for improper reasons.
Imagine that the head of the EPA holds a much more extreme
view of environmental protection than could be justified by
statutory law or public opinion.  Or consider the possibility that
the head of OSHA might try to limit workplace protections in
order to cultivate relationships with political allies in the busi-
ness world.  The EPA might choose to value headaches at $100
or $1000 rather than $20, while OSHA might value them at $1
or 1 cent.  In this way, the agencies could engineer cost-benefit
analyses that rationalize regulations chosen for other reasons.
While this concern is a legitimate one, the proper response
is not to ban regulators from relying on their priors or to force
them to assign zero value to hard-to-quantify benefits or costs.
Such a ban would make no sense: people cannot avoid relying
on their priors.  As we argue below, when courts or OIRA have a
good reason for believing that an agency is biased, then they
should be skeptical of the agency’s work product—all of the
work product, not just the unquantified benefits.  But often
they will not have such a reason.
A fourth concern is that if agencies can justify a regulation
on the basis of unquantified benefits, then regulators will be
lazy.145  It is nearly always the case that when a regulation is
first considered, the potential benefits are not yet quantified.
The regulator must decide whether to commission studies to
quantify those benefits or not.  A budget-constrained regulator
may be tempted to claim that some benefits are unquantifiable
to avoid having to fund a study.  But if regulators were allowed
to do this, then frequently regulations would be approved that
are not cost-justified.
However, banning regulators from relying on unquantified
benefits is too extreme a response to this problem.  Instead,
OIRA, courts, and other reviewers should demand a good ex-
planation for why benefits are unquantifiable.  And when regu-
lators articulate their priors by stating their assumptions, this
will impose self-discipline on them and make it difficult to ex-
aggerate the costs of doing additional studies.
Finally, in a recent paper addressing the problem of regula-
tion in the face of uncertainty, Cass Sunstein advocates what
145 See Hahn, supra note 55, at 1037–38. R
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he calls “breakeven analysis,” a practice that is also recom-
mended by OMB.146  As OMB puts it, when an agency faces
uncertainty, it should ask itself, “How small could the value of
the non-quantified benefits be (or how large would the value of
the non-quantified costs need to be) before the rule would yield
zero net benefits?”147  However, OMB’s proposal is puzzling.  It
does not tell the agency how the answer to that question should
guide it.  Indeed, in the same paragraph OMB tells agencies to
use their “professional judgment in determining how important
the non-quantified benefits or costs may be in the context of
the overall analysis.”148
Sunstein provides a number of examples that might indi-
cate what OMB means.  In one example, a clean-water regula-
tion will cost $200 million but the benefits cannot be specified.
Sunstein says that under breakeven analysis, the agency
should ask how many water bodies will be affected, how they
would be improved, how people would be helped, and other
related questions.  He then suggests that, for example, if only
twenty small water bodies are affected by the regulation, and
these water bodies are rarely used by people, then the regula-
tion would fail breakeven analysis.  The breakeven analysis
indicates that there must be at least $10 million of benefits for
each water body for the regulation to generate positive net ben-
efits.  That may seem implausible.  But if there are 200,000
water bodies and they are frequently used by people, then the
regulation might pass breakeven analysis.149
As we interpret it, breakeven analysis is in some respects
consistent with the approach we recommend.  Breakeven anal-
ysis requires that agencies quantify as much as they can and
then make a reasonable judgment based on the quantification.
We agree with this argument as far as it goes.  But that reason-
able judgment must be based upon some intuition, prior
probability, or best guess.  Agencies should do more than just
pronounce judgment: they should make explicit the institution
or prior that underlies the judgment and describe it with as
much specificity as possible.  That is, agencies should make
specific “point” estimates of the benefits and costs of the regu-
lation.  In the example above, the agency should not only iden-
tify the number of water bodies and the number of people who
146 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1372; see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra R
note 9, at 2. R
147 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 9, at 2 R
148 Id.
149 Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1387–88. R
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use them but also estimate the monetized benefit to the people
who use those bodies based on how they use them (for recrea-
tion, for potable water, for industrial use, etc.).  After all, the
agency must be doing this implicitly when it decides whether or
not to promulgate the regulation.  The agency should be forced
to make that implicit judgment explicit so that it can be evalu-
ated and studied.  Further analysis may reveal that, in fact, the
people who use the twenty small water bodies are greatly bene-
fited by the clean water, while the people who use the 200,000
water bodies are hardly benefited at all.  If so, the agency’s
initial judgment was mistaken.
Our argument—and here we disagree with Sunstein—is
that quantification of all relevant costs and benefits is neces-
sary, even those that people insist are “unquantifiable,” and
therefore the exercise of calculating the minimum benefits nec-
essary for the regulation to create zero net benefits is idle.  If
uncertainty seems overwhelming, agencies should nonetheless
provide a point estimate, along with information about their
confidence level.  They should also indicate how further infor-
mation gathering about the impact of the regulation itself on
people’s well-being after it has been issued will help reduce
uncertainty so that the regulation can be revised in the future.
C. Institutional Responses to Regulatory Uncertainty
If our argument is correct, then the regulatory system
should not avoid using priors but instead should institutional-
ize them.  By this we mean that agencies should be permitted
to rely on priors, but processes should be in place to ensure
that agencies do not abuse their power to do so.  We suggest
the following reforms.
First, while agencies should be permitted to rely on priors,
they should also be forced to articulate them.  Accordingly,
agencies should not be permitted to justify a regulation that
otherwise fails a (quantified) cost-benefit analysis by appealing
to “unquantified benefits.”  Instead, agencies should identify
the unquantified benefits and then publish an estimate of what
they are.  For example, if agencies believe that emission of a
chemical substance will cause headaches, they should publish
estimates of the population exposed to the chemical substance,
the fraction they believe to be susceptible to headaches, and a
valuation for an avoided headache.  The agency should be al-
lowed to rely on pure guesswork or intuition except to the ex-
tent that some elements of this calculation (such as the
population that is exposed) can be verified empirically.  The
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agency must be clear that it is guessing—that is, relying on a
prior.
Second, agencies should be required to provide an institu-
tional mechanism for updating their priors.  One such mecha-
nism would be a requirement in the regulation itself that the
regulator revisit its assumptions about unquantified benefits
in the future—say, in one year or five years.  The agency would
further be required to publish a statement in which it confirms
or modifies the assumptions behind the prior.  The agency will
be permitted to update the prior as long as it provides reasons.
If the regulation appears not to be cost-benefit justified after
the regulator has updated its priors, then the regulation should
be repealed or amended in such a way that it satisfies a cost-
benefit test.  Alternatively, agencies could put in place mecha-
nisms for reviewing the priors for all regulations rather than
provide for such mechanisms in each regulation.  This review of
priors could take place as part of the broader retrospective
review of regulations implemented by the Obama
Administration.150
Third, from time to time OIRA should evaluate the accu-
racy of the priors used by agencies in their regulations.  If pri-
ors are frequently revised, this is evidence that the agency does
not have very good intuitions about the hard-to-quantify bene-
fits of regulations within its expertise or that regulators act in a
political or ideological fashion (especially if the revisions occur
across administrations).  OIRA might give less deference to the
priors of agencies that frequently revise them.
Fourth, OIRA should also examine cases where different
agencies give different valuations to the same types of benefits.
Suppose that the EPA and OSHA offer different valuations for
avoided headaches, based on their priors.  OIRA might then
150 See Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. § 258, 258 (2013), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 106–07 (2012) (“[I]t is particularly important for agencies to
conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether they remain
justified and whether they should be modified or streamlined in light of changed
circumstances . . . .”); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215, 217 (2012), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03 (2012) (“To facilitate the periodic review
of existing significant regulations, agencies shall consider how best to promote
retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome . . . .”); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2014-5: RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES 1
(2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation
%25202014-5%2520%2528Retrospective%2520Review%2529_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MEP8-9VYH] (recommending retrospective review); Retrospective Re-
view of Regulations, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/oira/regulation-reform [https://perma.cc/9MTS-7R84] (describing Obama
administration efforts to review regulations).
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convene an interagency group to conduct empirical analysis
and resolve the inconsistency.151
To illustrate the effects of this reform, let us consider again
the school lunch regulation.  Recall that the regulator disclosed
the costs of the regulation but said that the benefits—improved
nutrition for schoolchildren—were unquantifiable.152  Under
our approach, the regulator would be required to provide esti-
mates (in some cases, guesses) of the following numbers: (1)
the number of children who would consume this new lunch,
taking into the account that some children might throw out a
lunch that does not taste good; (2) the nutritional effect of the
new lunch, taking into account that this may vary across body
types, demographic groups, and so on, meaning that the regu-
lator would also need to rely on demographic and related infor-
mation if it is available, and to make guesses if not; (3) the
health effect of the improved nutrition, again taking into ac-
count differences across body types, demographic groups, and
so on; and (4) the monetary value of the health effect.
It is important to observe that the calculation of the lunch
regulation’s benefits would be based on a range of types of
information—some of it easily quantified, others of it not.  For
example, the regulator will be able to start with basic demo-
graphic information that is probably already in its possession
or is otherwise easily available.  However, the regulator will
only be able to guess about the effect of improved nutrition on
life expectancy, health, self-esteem, and so on.  We would per-
mit the regulator to make those guesses; our only requirement
is that it quantifies them.
Next, the regulator must issue a plan that explains how it
will test its assumptions.  At one extreme, the regulator might
implement a randomized trial by mandating the new lunches
for some children and not others.  But randomized trials are
expensive and not always practical.  Another approach is to
plan to conduct surveys of schools and families, in order to find
out whether children throw out lunches or eat them, and of
doctors, who might be asked to report if obese children in the
151 This is already done from time to time, as illustrated by the establishment
of the INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 1–3, 33 (2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93UM-CLS3].
152 Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4107 (Jan. 26, 2012) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 210 &
220).
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program lose weight.  All of this information can then be used
at a later time to evaluate the regulator’s initial assumptions.
When the review period arrives, we might discover, for ex-
ample, that the regulator over- or underestimated the number
of children who would throw out lunches.  If so, in deciding
whether to renew the regulation, the regulator would be re-
quired to update this assumption, even while it would be al-
lowed to make guesses with respect to valuations or
probabilities that remain unknown.  If the regulator changes
these valuations without explanation in order to maintain that
the regulation is no longer cost-justified based on the posterior
with respect to the assumption in question, then the reviewer
may well be skeptical that the regulator acts in good faith.153
D. Two Examples
1. The EEOC’s ADA Regulations
In 2011, the EEOC issued a regulation that expanded the
definition of “disability,” broadening the class of people entitled
to “reasonable accommodations” under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.154  The EEOC expected the regulation to bene-
fit disabled people by entitling them to assistance and other
forms of accommodation from their employers, which would in
turn also make it more difficult for employers to fire them for
failing to perform their job adequately.  The EEOC also ac-
knowledged that the regulation would impose costs on employ-
ers, who would be required to provide possibly expensive
accommodations and retain people who do not contribute
much to the bottom line.
On the cost side, the EEOC used surveys and other
sources of information to estimate the total number of people in
the work force with disabilities and the fraction of them not
covered by the older, narrower definition.  The final estimate
was 12 to 38.4 million people.155  Another survey (of disabled
153 To our knowledge, there has not been any discussion in the legal literature
of the use of Bayesian cost-benefit analysis by regulators.  However, Bayesian
approaches to cost-effectiveness analysis, which is closely analogous, have been
explored in the medical literature. See, e.g., Andrew H. Briggs, A Bayesian Ap-
proach to Stochastic Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 17 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT
HEALTH CARE 69, 70–71, 75 (2001).  And there has been some discussion by law
professors of Bayes’ Rule in the context of policy evaluation. See Matthew D.
Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L.,
& ETHICS 1, 53–54 (2006); Strnad, supra note 139, at 200–03. R
154 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978, 16987 (Mar. 25,
2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
155 Id. at 16991–94.
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people) suggested that 16% of the people under the new defini-
tion would request a new accommodation that would be re-
quired under the new regulation.  That implied 2.0-6.1 million
requests.156  Next, using another source of data (from a survey
of employers), the EEOC estimated the mean cost of an accom-
modation at $150.  After further calculations, the EEOC esti-
mated the cost of the regulation at $60-$183 million per
year.157
On the benefits side, the EEOC acknowledged that in its
preliminary impact analysis, it did not attempt to quantify or
even itemize the possible benefits from the regulation.158  In
response to comments, it noted that a survey existed that sepa-
rately itemized the benefits of accommodation (“[c]ompany re-
tained a valued employee;” “[i]ncreased the employee’s
productivity;” etc.).159  While the survey did not ask employers
for the monetary value of these benefits, the EEOC observed
that retention is valuable because it avoids the cost of hiring a
person—which on average was $1,978 in 2009.  The EEOC also
said that the regulation would improve “[e]fficiencies in
[l]itigation,” create “[f]uller [e]mployment” (which “will stimulate
the economy”), generate “[n]on-discrimination and [o]ther
[i]ntrinsic [b]enefits,” which would reduce “stigma, exclusion,
and humiliation, and promote[ ] self-respect,” and so on.160
This analysis of benefits is plainly inadequate.  Most of the
benefits are not estimated.  The one quantification implicitly
assumes that an employer would not (on average) voluntarily
pay $150 for an accommodation in order to avoid spending
$1,978 to find a replacement.  The EEOC could have, and
should have, done better.
The starting point is to estimate the value of the accommo-
dations to employees.  To use one of the EEOC’s examples, the
regulation might mandate an employer to offer voice-recogni-
tion technology to an employee who has multiple sclerosis and
hence difficulty typing.  The worker would clearly be willing to
pay a positive amount for this assistance, which will make
work easier or more pleasurable.  That amount could be esti-
mated with the help of surveys; even if surveys are too expen-
sive, the regulator may be able to make some reasonable
guesses.  For example, if the worker is paid $20 per hour and
156 Id. at 16992.
157 Id. at 16998
158 Id. at 16996–98.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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must work five hours in order to perform work that other work-
ers can do in four hours, then the benefit is worth $20 for every
five hours of work.  (In five hours, the worker can earn $125
rather than $100.)  Similar sorts of calculations can be per-
formed for other types of accommodations.
The EEOC would also need to take into account the fact
that the regulation takes place within the labor market.  This
raises two additional issues.  First, the EEOC would need to
satisfy itself that employers do not offer accommodations that
would save themselves money.  This is, of course, possible; but
it is most likely to be true when the benefits do not fully accrue
to the employer.  For example, if an accommodation requires
the employer to train the worker to use voice-recognition tech-
nology, the employer will not capture the benefits of the train-
ing if the worker uses this training at home or in future jobs.
Second, the EEOC must take into account the risk that
employers might refuse to hire disabled people because of the
cost of providing them with accommodations.  The EEOC’s
bland assurance that the regulation would increase employ-
ment is belied by empirical evidence that the ADA reduced
rather than increased employment of disabled people.161  A
framework exists for estimating the possible unemployment
effects of mandates, and the EEOC should be required to use it
in order to estimate the employment effects of the
regulation.162
A final point is that even if the EEOC could not have rea-
sonably undertaken these calculations, the EEOC should have
stated an explicit guess as to what it believed the benefits of the
regulation would be.  Imagine that the average wage of the
people affected by the regulation was $40,000 and that the
effect of the regulation was either to make work somewhat
easier or to enable a person to take a more preferred over a less
preferred job.  We could imagine the EEOC reasonably guess-
ing that an affected person would pay, say, $1,000 for the
accommodation.  As a result, the regulation would pass a cost-
benefit analysis.
But this is not an empty exercise.  For one thing, it would
bar outrageous guesses ($100,000 or even $10,000) that would
rationalize a much more expensive regulation.  More impor-
161 See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment
Protection?  The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915,
917 (2001).
162 See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223.
230–72 (2000).
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tantly, the EEOC would be on record.  In the future, employers
would be permitted to come forth with surveys and related
evidence that show that workers value the benefits at only $50
or $100 on average.  If employers plausibly made such a case,
then the EEOC would be required to declare that the regulation
fails a cost-benefit test.
2. The EPA’s Mercury Regulation
The regulation in our data with the greatest projected eco-
nomic cost is the EPA’s 2012 regulation of coal- and oil-fired
power plants.163  This regulation was triggered by an EPA find-
ing that mercury—which these types of plants emit—is a haz-
ardous air pollutant that the EPA must regulate under §§ 111
and 112 of the Clean Air Act.  As we explained, the EPA quanti-
fied only one benefit from reducing mercury: reduction in the
harm to children’s intelligence from ingesting mercury when
eating freshwater fish.164  The EPA estimated that the regula-
tion would prevent the loss of 510.8 IQ points across all af-
fected children, which it valued at approximately $5 million (or
$10,000 per point of IQ).165  The EPA also quantified the regu-
latory benefits from reducing emissions of various types of par-
ticulate matter, which would be affected by the same
technologies used to reduce mercury emissions.166  The EPA
described these as “co-benefits,” because the EPA’s authority
to regulate power plants derives from the fact that they emit
mercury, and the benefits of reducing particulate matter are
ancillary to the regulation of mercury.167  The EPA calculated
that the particulate matter reductions would result in approxi-
163 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance
for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and
Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg.
9304, 9307 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).
164 EPA supra note 3, at ES–11 tbl.ES–5. R
165 Id. at ES–5 tbl.ES–3, ES–6 tbl.ES–4.
166 Particulate matter includes a variety of metallic compounds, such as chro-
mium compounds, which are known carcinogens and have a significant impact on
respiratory health. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Stan-
dards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9,360; EPA, supra note 3, at ES–5 tbl.ES–3, R
ES–6 to ES–7 tbl.ES–4.
167 EPA, supra note 3, at 5–1. R
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mately $63 billion in benefits, against approximately $9.6 bil-
lion in costs.168
It might seem as though the EPA’s failures to quantify ad-
ditional mercury-related benefits should be irrelevant in light of
this large disparity between costs and benefits.  But as we de-
scribed in the introduction, that was not the case.  In Michigan
v. EPA, the Supreme Court struck down the regulation because
of the disparity between the costs and benefits of the mercury
effects alone.169  The explanation stems from the nature of the
EPA’s legal authority.  The EPA was required to “perform a
study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to
occur as a result of emissions”170 and then promulgate regula-
tions if it finds that “regulation is appropriate and necessary”
with respect to any given air pollutant.171  The EPA conceded,
and the Court agreed, that when it made this “appropriate and
necessary” finding with respect to mercury, only the benefits
and costs related to mercury were relevant.172  That is, the EPA
was not permitted to account for any ancillary regulatory bene-
fits such as particulate matter reductions.  If one considers
only mercury, the cost-benefit ratio looks very bad: $9.6 billion
in costs to only about $5 million in benefits.173  This unfavora-
ble ratio placed the EPA in the uncomfortable position of hav-
ing to argue that costs were irrelevant to the appropriate-and-
necessary finding that triggered the EPA’s obligation to regulate
mercury.  Despite the fact that the EPA was entitled to Chevron
deference, the Court rejected this argument.
The EPA was right to perform a cost-benefit analysis and to
promulgate a regulation whose benefits exceeded its costs.
Our point is that the EPA’s failure to fully quantify mercury
benefits likely had both policy and legal ramifications.  From a
policy perspective, the EPA might well have chosen to promul-
gate a more stringent regulation had it fully understood the
benefits of regulating mercury.  And from a legal perspective, a
more thorough accounting of the benefits of eliminating mer-
168 Id. at ES–2 tbl.ES–1. The EPA estimated that the regulation would produce
between $37 and $90 billion in benefits at a 3% discount rate; the figure in the
text is the midpoint of the range. Id.
169 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015).
170 Id. at 2705 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).
171 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).
172 Id. at 2706, 2711 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).
173 Id. at 2706.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 47  8-NOV-16 12:37
2016] UNQUANTIFIED BENEFITS 133
cury might have allowed the rule to survive the Supreme
Court’s aggressive standard of review.174
What should the EPA have done differently?  To begin with,
it should have estimated the other mercury-related benefits it
was aware of.  The EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis lists sev-
eral other unquantified mercury-related benefits: reducing de-
velopmental delays, memory loss, and behavioral dysfunctions;
reductions in various harms to cardiovascular health; and
avoiding a variety of toxic immunologic effects.175  The regula-
tion also mentions environmental benefits to fish, birds, and
mammals and to the recreational hunters and fisherman who
catch them.176
Surprisingly, the agency acknowledged that it has access
to significant information on all of these effects.  It has quanti-
fied the mercury reduction from the regulation, which it esti-
mated at approximately 19.9 tons in the first year of the
regulation (2015), with similar amounts in subsequent
years.177  In order to determine the regulatory benefits to chil-
dren, the EPA first determined which waterways the regulation
would affect.  Then, using census tract data, it calculated the
number of people living in proximity to those waterways.  It
then employed survey data to determine the percentage of
those individuals who catch and eat freshwater fish.  The EPA
next used fertility rate data to estimate the number of children
who would be exposed to mercury prenatally when their
mothers ate freshwater fish.178  The EPA’s model thus took the
form:
# children exposed = # people near affected waterways ×
percentage who are anglers ×
fertility rate
The EPA ran this calculation on an extensive database com-
prising all 64,500 census tracts and over 5,000 waterways to
arrive at the conclusion that approximately 239,000 children
are affected each year.179  Along the way to this conclusion, the
EPA necessarily calculated the number of adults who con-
sumed mercury—the calculation of the number of affected chil-
174 The rule should have survived judicial review in any event because overall
benefits dramatically exceeded costs.  The Court’s focus on mercury costs and
benefits, to the exclusion of other considerations, only highlights the importance
of fully quantifying costs and benefits.
175 EPA, supra note 3, at ES–11 tbl.ES–5. R
176 Id. at ES–12 to ES–13 tbl.ES–6.
177 Id. at 3–10.
178 Id. at 4–38 to 4–45, 48–49.
179 Id. at 51–53 tbl.4–5.
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dren is based upon the number of adults discounted by the
fertility rate.  But the agency never reported this figure (or any
of the underlying data); the number of children is the only
reported measure.
The EPA then used survey data and a database of over
50,000 water samples that it had tested to determine that the
average mother (of these 239,000 children) would consume
3.04 micrograms of mercury per day.180  The agency used fur-
ther modeling to estimate that this would produce a total IQ
loss across all children of 25,545 points, or approximately
1/10 of an IQ point per child.  The regulation would reduce
mercury deposits by approximately 2%, resulting in a net bene-
fit of 510 IQ points, or approximately 1/500 of an IQ point per
child.
With its data on the number of affected adults (which the
agency possesses but does not report), its information on the
reductions in mercury composition, and models of the other
health effects of mercury, the agency could have provided fur-
ther estimates of the benefits of mercury reduction.  Sources
exist that could have been used to model the effects of mercury
reductions on other types of health benefits.  The EPA directs
anyone seeking “more information” to the EPA’s own 2002 Inte-
grated Risk Information System (IRIS) on methylmercury,
which includes models of mercury’s health effects and the ben-
efits of reducing exposure.181  The EPA also directs readers to a
2000 study by the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, which “provides a thorough review of the
effects of [methylmercury] on human health.”182  The EPA even
produced its own mercury study in a 1997 Report to Congress,
which details many of the environmental harms associated
with mercury and provides estimates of the benefits of mitiga-
tion.183  Finally, there is a substantial body of nongovernmen-
tal scientific evidence documenting the effects of mercury
exposure on life and health.184
To get a sense of the potential magnitude of these other
health effects, consider the following back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation.  Suppose that the average adult lives until age sev-
180 Id. at 54.
181 Id. at ES–11 tbl.ES–5.
182 Id. at 4–4.
183 EPA, supra note 8, at O–1 to O–4, 4–2 to 4–4 tbl.4–1 (providing an eight R
volume report detailing the magnitude of U.S. mercury emissions and their
implications).
184 See, e.g., HASSAUER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3–4 (surveying the literature of R
mercury toxicity).
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enty and that each adult has on average one child.  In any given
year, if there are 239,000 children exposed to mercury
prenatally, there will be 16.73 million adults exposed.  (Again,
the EPA calculated but did not report this figure.)  Imagine that
mercury exposure at current levels creates a 1 in 50,000 risk of
suffering a fatal heart attack and that the effect is linear.  That
would mean that at current emissions levels, 334.6 adults will
suffer fatal heart attacks due to mercury’s effects on cardiovas-
cular health.  A regulation that reduced mercury concentra-
tions by 2% would eliminate 6.7 fatal heart attacks.  The EPA
values a statistical life at $7.4 million.185  These cardiovascular
benefits would then have a value of $48.9 million—significantly
higher than the IQ benefits.
To justify its failure to make these calculations, the EPA
argued that it did not have “sufficient confidence in available
data or methods,” that “current evidence is only suggestive of
causality or there are other significant concerns over the
strength of the association,” and that it faced “time and re-
source limitations.”186  The agency should have offered its best
estimate of the regulation’s benefits given the information
available to it, while explaining and documenting any sources
of uncertainty.  This might have cast the agency’s decision to
regulate mercury, despite only $5 million in quantified bene-
fits, in a different light.
Less legally significant than the agency’s failure to estimate
additional mercury-related benefits is its failure to estimate the
benefits of reductions in ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen diox-
ide, and carbon dioxide emissions.187  Any reduction in emis-
sions from coal- and oil-fired electrical plants will necessarily
reduce emissions of these gases, along with mercury and par-
ticulate matter.  The benefits to life, health, and the environ-
ment from reduced emissions of these four gases are extensive.
Moreover, the EPA has regulated all of these gases in different
contexts, and so it has already priced many of the benefits.188
(With respect to these gases, the EPA relied heavily on the
185 Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-eco
nomics/mortality-risk-valuation [https://perma.cc/4MBG-RYHJ] (estimating the
value of a statistical life in 2006 dollars).
186 EPA, supra note 3, at ES–11 nn.b–d. R
187 See id. at ES–10 to ES–13 tbl.ES–6.
188 See id. For instance, an interagency group, which included the EPA, has
already put a price on reduced carbon emissions. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric
A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 1557, 1566 (2011) (noting the available data on carbon dioxide regulation
costs).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 50  8-NOV-16 12:37
136 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:87
excuse that it was constrained by “time and resource limita-
tions for this analysis.”189)  Even though a full accounting of
these benefits would not have refuted the legal challenge to this
regulation, the EPA’s decision to leave them unquantified was
nonetheless unwise.
CONCLUSION
Agencies regularly promulgate regulations for which they
do not fully quantify costs and benefits.  This is the norm, not
the exception; between 2010 and 2013, agencies promulgated
only two major regulations with fully quantified benefits and
costs and more than 100 regulations without.  In many cases,
these regulations involved significant, measurable costs in ex-
cess of $100 million and no quantified benefits.  Nonetheless,
the agencies proceeded with the regulations based upon little
more than conclusory statements that, in the agencies’ judg-
ments, the benefits justified the costs.  This is not sound
practice.
We do not argue that agencies should regulate only when
they can monetize, with a high degree of confidence, all benefits
and all costs.  To the contrary, we advocate that agencies state
their priors about the benefits and costs they cannot fully
quantify; update those priors given the evidence available to
them; and proceed with regulation if they believe that the bene-
fits outweigh the costs.  The agency must make clear its priors
and provide as much information regarding costs and benefits
as it can gather, rather than omitting critical information.
Those priors should then be scrutinized and updated as fur-
ther information becomes available.  OIRA should lead the way
by rejecting proposed regulations that do not take these steps.
Courts should reject as arbitrary and capricious any regulation
based upon priors that an agency does not properly update.
Uncertainty should not be an insurmountable barrier to
agency action, but it should not be used to provide cover for
regulation that cannot be justified.
We also think that regulators should be allowed to cite
equity, dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts, but they
must avoid using these ideas as boilerplate.  Distributive im-
pacts can and should be identified (they never are).  And none
of these concepts should be used as an excuse for failing to
quantify benefits.  If the regulator believes that a regulation
189 See EPA, supra note 3, at ES–11 n.b, ES–13 n.b, 5–5 n.a, 5–7 n.a. R
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that fails a cost-benefit analysis should nonetheless be issued,
it should still disclose the cost-benefit analysis.
Uncertainty cannot be wished away, but it can be ad-
dressed with institutional methods.  Under the dynamic ap-
proach we advocate, regulators will often rely on priors—in the
vernacular, they will have to “guess.”  But they will be required
to identify their priors in quantitative terms and use institu-
tional mechanisms to ensure that the priors are updated in a
rigorous way.  The alternative is economically unsound and
may in some cases be legally fatal.
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